Https- Graph.microsoft.com V1.0 Applications Guide

Invoke-RestMethod -Method Post -Uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications" -Headers $authHeader -Body $body -ContentType "application/json"

1. Over-privileged app roles via appRoles You can define custom roles in the appRoles array. The danger: any admin can assign users to those roles without extra approval if the app has been consented. Audit appRoles regularly. 2. Leaking identifierUris If your app uses identifierUris (e.g., api://my-app ), that URI becomes a potential token target. An attacker who can register a conflicting URI in another tenant cannot take over your app—but they can cause token validation confusion if your app incorrectly validates the aud claim. 3. requiredResourceAccess creep Apps can request requiredResourceAccess —permissions they need. Over time, developers add scopes but never remove old ones. Attackers can use orphaned, high-privilege permissions if an app's secret is compromised. https- graph.microsoft.com v1.0 applications

In Microsoft Graph, an ( /applications ) is the global, multi-tenant definition of an app—its logo, requested permissions, redirect URIs, and certs/secrets. Invoke-RestMethod -Method Post -Uri "https://graph

"requests": [ "id": "1", "method": "GET", "url": "/applications/id/passwordCredentials" , "id": "2", "method": "GET", "url": "/applications/id/keyCredentials" ] Audit appRoles regularly

Have you hit any weird edge cases with /applications ? Found an undocumented field? Let me know—I'm collecting them for a follow-up post.

Whether you're automating app lifecycle, building an internal governance tool, or hunting for security misconfigurations, this endpoint is your scalpel. Use it with precision, respect its throttling limits, and always—always—validate the signInAudience before you deploy.